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GEORGE WEBER

The Humanitarian and Human Right
Duties of the United Nations Security Council
ABSTRACT.
International intervention has increased in recent
history for the abuses of humanitarian law and human
rights. This article reflects on the history of human rights
and humanitarian law reasoned interventions authorized by
the United Nations Security Council and examines whether
a duty now exists in international law for future action. The
question of whether a duty exists, and the legal
repercussions of failing to exercise that duty, is of
paramount importance to international law. Whether the
duty currently exists or is currently developing, the analysis
that follows will show why the Security Council should
have the duty of intervention and how the duty is emerging
from both practice and necessity.
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Introduction
It was generally agreed that the situation in Libya,
where government forces targeted civilians, authorized
unlawful killings, committed sexual violence, and recruited
children for armed conflict, was a violation of human rights
Due to the
and international humanitarian law.1
circumstances of armed violence in Libya, the United
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 (2011) to
authorize intervention in order to stop violations of human
rights law, international humanitarian law, and crimes
against humanity.2
The Security Council authorized
intervention, as it has done in the past, to protect people
from internal abuse by state governmental authority.
This article examines whether the Security Council
has developed a duty to authorize intervention when gross
human rights and humanitarian law violations occur.
Although past cases have seen the Security Council
authorize intervention in situations where human rights and
humanitarian law are violated, little thought is given as to
whether there is a duty to authorize such intervention.3
In analyzing the question in support of a duty, I will
examine the international importance placed on human
rights and humanitarian law by treaty and custom; how the
1

See. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (March 17, 2011).
Resolution 1973 describes the official reasons for authorizing
intervention and gives the Security Council’s views regarding the
situation in Libya as a definite violation of human rights and
international humanitarian law. Id.
2
Id.
3
See infra notes 85-120.
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United Nations Charter framework, in its present form,
ensures that human rights and humanitarian law are
adhered to only on a selective basis; why the ultimate
responsibility to ensure adherence falls to the Security
Council; and how that responsibility has been exercised in
the past by the Security Council.
This question is particularly relevant considering
the “Arab Spring” taking place in northern Africa and the
Middle East.4 In Syria, for example, there is extensive
evidence that governmental forces have committed human
rights violations against their own citizenry.5 In the case of
Syria, however, the Security Council has been slow to reply
compared to the overwhelming response to the Libyan
situation. Although the Security Council had at one point
responded by requiring a cease-fire and sending unarmed
observers, there is little evidence of that limited measure’s
success considering the history of the protracted conflict

4

The Arab Spring is “a succession of civilian uprisings” in the
Middle East and Northern Africa targeted at oppressive regimes.
Jonathan Masters, Issue Guide: One Year of ‘Arab Spring’ Upheavals,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/issue-guide-one-year-arab-springupheavals/p26764.
5
See S.C. Res. 2043, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (Apr. 21, 2012); S.C.
Res 2042, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042 (Apr. 14, 2012); Michael Haggerson,
UN investigators: human rights violations in Syria increasing, JURIST
(Sept. 17, 2012), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/09/un-investigatorshuman-rights-violations-in-syria-increasing.php; Human Rights in
Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/node/106266 (last
visited Apr. 14, 2013); Independent UN panel urges action amid
ongoing human rights abuses in Syria conflict, UN NEWS CENTRE (Feb
18, 2013),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44163&Cr=syria&Cr
1=human%20rights#.UVO0jL9i5hg; UN Report: Syrian forces commit
‘gross violations’ of human rights, CNN (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/28/world/meast/syria-un-report.
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and evidence of defiance on the part of the parties
involved.6
When violations of human rights, international
humanitarian law, and crimes against humanity occur, what
entity other than the Security Council has the authority
under international law to authorize intervention? Are
states able to intervene lawfully without the Security
Council’s authority? The answer to the latter question is
probably not.7
The question of whether a duty exists and the legal
repercussions of failing to exercise that duty are of
paramount importance to international law. Regardless of
whether there is an existing duty, this paper attempts to
answer why the Security Council should have a duty to
authorize intervention in the face of gross human rights
violations while still respecting the fundamental precepts to
the principle of non-intervention. Although there may not
be enough agreement to state with certainty that such a duty
currently exists, there is certainly evidence of an emerging
duty on the part of the Security Council to intervene in
cases of gross human rights violations.
Moreover,
6

S.C. Res 2043, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (April 21, 2012); S.C.
Res. 2042, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042 (April 14, 2012); Independent UN
panel urges action amid ongoing human rights abuses in Syria conflict,
UN NEWS CENTER (Feb 18, 2013),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44163&Cr=syria&Cr
1=human%20rights#.UVO0jL9i5hg; CNN Wire Staff, U.N. authorizes
300 unarmed Syria monitors, CNN (Apr. 21, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/21/world/meast/syriaunrest/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.
7
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. The United Nations Charter
specifically decries in Article 2(4) that states cannot violate the
sovereign territorial integrity of another state. The exceptions to this
rule are outlined in Chapter VII where the Security Council can
authorize intervention. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-51.
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international legal values suggest that such a duty should
exist.
My analysis will show why the Security Council
should have a duty to authorize intervention in the face of
gross human rights violations, and how a duty is emerging
from Security Council practice and from necessity.
I.
Security Council: A Merely Permissive Legal
Framework
The United Nations Charter sets up a framework
where intervention into the territory of another state is only
permissible when authorized by the Security Council or
where self-defense is employed.8 The Security Council
must even, under Article 39, determine the existence of a
threat to international peace and security before the legal
framework of the Charter will permit intervention.9 A
possible exception to Security Council authorization and
self-defense is the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which is
discussed below.10 However, without any of the
8

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; U.N. Charter arts. 39-43, 51.
U.N. Charter art. 39.
10
Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377(V) A, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/377(V) (Nov. 3 1950); “[T]he Assembly’s power in maintaining
international peace and security is only recommendatory, not
mandatory. It may only ‘make recommendation to the members of the
United Nations or to the Security Council or to both’, ‘discuss any
question relating to international peace and security’, call the attention
of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger
international peace and security’, and ‘recommend measures for the
peaceful adjustment of any situation’. However where ‘Uniting for
Peace’ resolutions are concerned, the General Assembly, not having
mandatory power conferred upon it by the Charter, can adopt resolution
that are binding in the sense that they are based on the principles of
international law. The Assembly’s function in this regard is the focal
point for state’ views on international law, not one that can be said to
create a mandatory power and certainly not one that grants the
9
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aforementioned justifications, intervention premised on any
basis that affects the sovereign territory of another state is
not permissible under the charter regime.
The legal basis for all intervention in the United
Nations Charter is Chapter VII. Chapter VII allows the
Security Council to determine a breach of the peace and to
take actions with respect to that breach.11 However, this
mechanism is completely voluntary—the determination of
whether there is a breach is solely within the hands of the
Security Council. Failure to determine “the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression”12 makes it impossible for intervention to occur;
by not recognizing a situation requisite for a legal
intervention, the world can do nothing. This entire process
is within the hands of the Security Council to determine. In
the human rights context, this means that intervention is
only legally valid if the Security Council declares a breach
of international peace and security with regard to human
rights violations is occurring, and authorizes intervention.
Under the Charter, as it stands now, a determination
that human rights violations are occurring, other than by the
Security Council under Article 39, would not constitute the
set of circumstances necessary to allow for intervention.13
Even widespread international belief in the existence of a
humanitarian crisis, human rights violations, or crimes
against humanity would not be enough to allow the
international community to intervene in such a way that is
Assembly a coercive power to order economic or military enforcement
measures.” Kamrul Hossain, Complementary Rule of the United
Nations General Assembly in Peace Management, Uluslararasi Hukuk
ve Politika [UHP] [REV. INT’L L & POL] 77,79 (2008) (Turk.).
11
U.N. Charter arts. 39-42.
12
U.N. Charter art. 39.
13
U.N. Charter arts. 2, 39-42.
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precluded under the Charter unless authorized by the
Security Council.
The reality of this problem is
contradictory to the philosophy behind the establishment of
the Security Council. Moreover, the only solution may be
to circumvent the Security Council entirely.
It has been suggested that the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention) may be a legal vehicle to
circumvent the Security Council.14 It is true that Article I
of the Genocide Convention calls on signatories to prevent
and punish genocide15 but Article VII requires the
signatories to go through the “competent organs of the
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the
United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.”16
The Uniting for Peace Resolution is a possible
solution to circumvent the Security Council’s necessary
determination of a threat to international peace and security
under Article 39, but it is imperfect – lacking the sturdy and
forceful effect of Security Council action.
The Uniting for Peace Resolution is compelling
because it shows the Charter regime is open to evolving
interpretation; however, it is no substitute for the Security
Council.17 The Resolution resolves that when the Security
14

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12,
1951); Eyal Mayroz, The Legal Duty to ‘Prevent’: After the Onset of
‘Genocide’, J. OF GENOCIDE RES. 79 (2012), available at
http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/About_Genocide__12_3_2_Leg
al_Duty_to_Prevent.pdf.
15
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 14.
16
Id.
17
G.A. Res. 337(V) A, supra note 10, at 4.
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Council cannot exercise its responsibility to maintain peace
and security, the General Assembly can act in its stead,
making recommendations for collective actions, including
armed force, to maintain international peace and security.18
The General Assembly has used this framework to
recommend several actions with respect to the use of force
when the Security Council was deadlocked.19
The
International Court of Justice has advised that Uniting for
Peace is legitimate under the Charter, including the
General Assembly’s approval of use of force, but limits
such authorization to the consent of the states concerned.20
Although Uniting for Peace gives options to the General
Assembly when the Security Council refuses to act, there is
still some question as to how effective the General
Assembly can be when utilizing the resolution.21 In
particular, requiring the consent of the states concerned can
be a huge obstacle especially in the human rights context,
when permission is required from an offending state.
The question of intervention would not be difficult
to answer but for the United Nations Charter principle of
non-intervention22 which prevents states from interfering in
the internal affairs of other states. This is not to say,
however, that the adoption of Article 2(4) was in any way a
bad idea – preventing war and promoting peace is the most
noble of ideas. But the presence of Article 2(4) in the
United Nations Charter creates an obstacle and prevents
intervention in cases of human rights violations. There is a
18

Id.
BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1002-4 (6th ed.
2011).
20
Id. at 1004; Kamrul Hossain, The Complementary Role of the
United Nations General Assembly in Peace Management, 4 Rev. Int’l
L. & Pol. 77, 83 (2008).
21
Carter, supra note 19, at 1004; See Hossain, supra note 20, at 83.
22
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
19
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need to remedy the obstacle of obstinacy on the part of the
Security Council when it neglects to authorize intervention
in situations where the humanitarian situation is dire. The
current Charter framework does not textually specify any
positive duty of the Security Council in the intervention
context. Considering the fact that the Council itself is the
only entity able to determine the “legal” existence of any
threat to international peace and security, based solely on
its own collective judgment and the ability of any one
permanent member to veto measures designed to consider
intervention, begs the question of whether a positive duty
exists or whether one should be imposed.23 Clearly, there
is need for a change; but is there a duty?
II. Importance of Human Rights, Humanitarian Law,
and The Responsibility to Protect
Human rights law and humanitarian law are of
paramount importance in international law as a whole.
Although both concepts are not the same, strictly speaking,
they are interrelated. Both branches of law are directly tied
to the United Nations as well as to individual states.
The International Court of Justice has described
portions of international humanitarian law and human
rights law as part of international custom so fundamental
that they cannot be violated.24 Relatedly, human rights law
is now looked upon and recognized as not within the sole

23

See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 24, 25, 39–42; Judith A. Miller,
NATO’s Use of Force in the Balkans, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 91, 91-92
(2000-2001).
24
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
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province of individual states but as an international law
principle transcending borders.25
In fact, The Responsibility to Protect report,
adopted by the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty, declares human rights to be a
mainstream part of international law—a “central subject
and responsibility of international relations.”26 Although
the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty is a commission set up by the government of
Canada, the report was recognized by the World Summit
Outcome Document in 200527, and its principles were
subsequently adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly28 and the United Nations Security Council.29
The report itself declares that states have a duty to protect
the human rights of their citizens—that it is first the
responsibility of state governments to protect citizenry
25

Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 278 (6th ed. 2008).
Rep. of the Int'l Comm'n on Intervention & State Sovereignty,
The Responsibility To Protect, 6 (2001), available at
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. The
Responsibility to Protect references, as support, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the four Geneva Conventions and two
Additional Protocols on international humanitarian law in armed
conflict, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the two 1966 Covenants relating to civil, political,
social, economic and cultural rights, and the adoption in 1998 of the
statute for the establishment of an International Criminal Court. Id.
27
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005); The Responsibility to Protect, supra note
26, at 2.
28
G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009);
Mahrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility?
The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of
International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 469, 479 (2010).
29
S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); see
also S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009); S.C. Res.
1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); Payandeh, supra note
28 at 478.
26
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from human rights abuses, humanitarian crises, and other
international crimes such as genocide.30 But, if states fail
to meet their responsibility, the international community
assumes the responsibility to respond through the United
Nations—particularly the Security Council.31 Human
rights are thought to be universal—meaning state borders
will not provide immunity from transgressions committed
in the name of sovereignty.32
Human rights protections are a reflection of values
that are important and fundamental to the operation and fair
treatment of other human beings. Apart from being a legal
issue of intervention, human rights violations are moral
wrongs committed directly against the value of human
existence. Internal state laws against killing and harming
others reflect this.33 As a human society, we have come to
the point where humane treatment is a staple right of all
persons. The evidence is present in the flood international
covenants, treaties, and resolutions by the United Nations
General Assembly and Security Council declaring
genocide, torture, rape, unlawful killing, and violence as
the antithesis of what is right for humanity.34
In short, international human rights and
international humanitarian law are of the utmost
importance to the values of humanity. However, when a
30

The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26 at XI; THOMAS
BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL,
119 (4th ed. 2009).
31
The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26, at XII.
32
Kok-Chor Tan, The Duty to Protect, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION 84, 90 (Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams eds.,
2006).
33
See John Mikhail, Is the Prohibition of Homicide Universal?
Evidence from Comparative Criminal Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 497,
515 (2009-10).
34
See The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26.
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sovereign state violates or allows human rights violations to
occur, there is no effective enforcement remedy under
international law because there is no compulsory or
consistent remedy offered or mandated by international
law. The only mechanism for authorizing intervention is
the United Nations through the Security Council35, an
entity that can at best be described as selective.
International human rights are so important to the
world order that the United Nations Charter included them
as a paramount principle—Article 55 of the Charter states
that the United Nations shall promote “universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.”36
Although the United Nations Charter is vague about
how respect and observance of human rights is to be
achieved, subsequent documents have defined the
importance and standing of human rights as reaching the
status of customary international law.37 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the United
Nations General Assembly, was interpreted, early on, as
being “an authoritative interpretation of the United Nations
Charter of the highest order” which has obtained the status
of customary international law.38 In addition to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two treaties, the
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural
35

U.N. Charter, arts. 39-51.
U.N. Charter art. 55, para. c.
37
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); Abdullahi Na-na'im,
The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim Context,
WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1987); Shannon Oliver, The International Fight
for Human Rights: Women Lately Discovered, 2 HOWARD SCROLL:
THE SOCIAL JUST. REV. 77, 85-86;
38
Na-na'im, supra note 37 at 502.
36
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Rights39 (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights40 (ICCPR), were ratified by many
states—showing the widespread acceptance by the world
community.41 In fact, some academics and theorists
believe that certain human rights have achieved the status
of jus cogens42 when it comes to crimes of physical
violence including torture, extra-judicial executions,
genocide, war crimes, disappearances, crimes against
humanity, and massive human suffering.43 They are
regarded as the highest category of international law, and of
such consequence that violation of human rights amounts to
a crime of the highest severity. K. Lee Boyd writes that jus
cogens crimes entail individual as well as state
responsibility to safeguard against the commission of such
crimes and equating a violation thereof to be a disruption of
the domestic and international order.44 Andrea Bianchi
39

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6136 at 490 (1966); opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
U.N.T.S. 2, available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A?RES/2200(XXI
).
40
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19,1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
41
Oliver, supra note 37 at 96.
42
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’
Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 203-79 (2006); K. Lee Boyd,
Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 1, 36 (2004). A jus cogens norm is a “peremptory norm of general
international law . . . accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
43
Bassiouni, supra note 42; Boyd, supra note 42; M. Cherif
Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996).
44
Boyd, supra note 42; Bassiouni, supra note 42.
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describes human rights, in general, as being synonymous
with jus cogens–that they developed together.45
The United Nations Charter memorializes human
rights as a paramount concern of the international
community. Although human rights can be said to have
originated before the Charter, it is the United Nations
Charter framework, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and all subsequent treaties, conventions,
resolutions, and the like that have raised human rights to
the level of customary international law and defined their
importance as worldwide human values. In short, human
rights are deserving of the highest protections, from the
individual level all the way to the international level
because when states fail to protect their citizens, or worse
commit human rights violations against them directly, only
a remedy with teeth will protect the prized rights of our
fellow men and women—intervention by the international
community.
III. Intervention
Framework

Beyond

the

United

Nations

Examining history is a good place to start when
discussing why the United Nations Charter Article 2
framework is so preventive.
Professor Mortimer Sellers, in his article The
Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention Under
International Law declares “humanitarian intervention has
always played an important part in international
relations.”46 He asserts that even the strongest proponents
45

Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19
EUR. J. INT’L LAW 491, 491-92 (2008).
46
Mortimer Sellers, The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention
Under International Law, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 67 (2001).
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of the principle of sovereignty have made exceptions for
intervention on “public welfare” grounds.47 Further, there
are examples of states, prior to the creation of the United
Nations, acting consistent with this theory.
In the 17th century, legal scholars believed that
intervention was appropriate when the mistreatment of state
nationals was occurring in another state that was so bad as
to shock the conscience of the international community.48
It was said that this doctrine co-existed with the concept of
sovereignty49—that sovereignty was not absolute and there
could exist circumstances that would supersede the
sovereign authority of the state.50 This concept, as stated
above, originated with the premise that protection of the
state’s nationals abroad was an interest that superseded the
offending state’s authority—that this doctrine of protecting
rights fundamental for human existence, over time, equated
to universal rights that are so essential that a state cannot
violate them.51 This led to the legal doctrine allowing
intervention by other states when the denial of human
rights occurred.52 In fact, Professor Sellers mentions that
“under ordinary international law, as it has existed for
centuries, states are entitled to take diplomatic, economic
and other ‘measures’, individually and collectively, against
states that have violated their international obligations.”53
The reference to “other measures” is a reference to the use
of force.

47

Id. at 67.
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 30, at 3.
49
FRANCIS KOFI ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND
PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 22 (1999).
50
Id. at 30.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Sellers, supra note 46, at 72.
48
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By the end of the 19th century a majority of
international legal scholars believed that the right of
intervention on humanitarian grounds existed.54 This
intervention had rules that governed when interference was
allowed–an international legal restraint perhaps.
Intervention would occur based on the grounds of “tyranny,
extreme atrocities, and violations of specific fundamental
rights” by the offending state.55 Additionally, there was a
preference that there be collective action by several states,
as opposed to unilateral intervention, and the intervention
only be instituted if undertaken for humanitarian motives.56
The preference for collective intervention was later
memorialized in the United Nations Charter and can be
seen in several articles.57
Several instances during the 1800s highlight the
exercise of this principle. From the intervention of France,
Britain, and Russia in Greece from 1827–1830 to stop
massacres committed by Turks;58 to the intervention of
France, after authorized by Britain, Austria, Prussia,
Russia, and Turkey, in 1860 in Syria to restore order;59 to
the intervention of Russia in the Balkans in 1877 due to
harsh treatment by the Ottoman Empire;60 and finally by
the United States in Cuba following the Cuban revolt
against the Spanish for humanitarian reasons.61
Despite the limiting principles in this legal doctrine,
it was often misused as a pretext for war.62 The largest
54

Abiew, supra note 49, at 40.
Id. at 43.
56
Id. at 42-43.
57
See U.N. Charter, arts. 43–49.
58
ABIEW, supra note 49, at 48.
59
Id. at 50.
60
Id. at 51.
61
Id. at 54.
62
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 30, at 3.
55
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example of using humanitarian intervention as an excuse
for war was Hitler’s argument that “Aryan” minorities were
bring oppressed in other states as a reason to incorporate
Austria into Germany and to justify the invasion of Poland
and Czechoslovakia.63 Consequently, Germany’s actions
and the failure of the League of Nations to prevent another
world conflict, drove the victors of World War II to create
the United Nations—hence the current Charter framework
for giving authority to intervene solely to the Security
Council.64
The old humanitarian principles that predate the
United Nations show a right of states to intervene for
humanitarian purposes.65
Kok-Chor Tan argues that, today, there is a general
duty, on the part of the international community, to
intervene—that when intervention is permissible, it is also
obligatory.66 He stresses that The Responsibility to Protect
report supports the theory that there is an “international
responsibility to protect” when human rights violations
occur that “shock the conscience of mankind.”67 Professor
Sellers agrees when he states, “some level of interference
by governments or individuals to prevent the human rights
abuses of others must be tolerated.”68
Both the General Assembly and Security Council
have adopted the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in
63

ABIEW, supra note 49, at 56-57.
Id.
65
Eve Massingham, Military Intervention for Humanitarian
Purposes: Does the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Advance the
Legality of the Use of Force for Humanitarian Ends?, 91 INT’L REV. OF
THE RED CROSS 803, 880-11 (2009).
66
TAN, supra note 32, at 90.
67
Id. at 88-89.
68
Sellers, supra note 46, at 67.
64
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resolutions declaring its protection principles to be
paramount.69 Although it is probably not held as a
customary international law norm, its presence in United
Nations resolutions and international discourse on
intervention at the very least shows the impact of The
Responsibility to Protect and its influence on intervention
considerations.70
The main point of The Responsibility to Protect
doctrine is that sovereignty is not absolute—that
sovereignty contains the responsibility of states to protect
their subjects and citizens.71 Under The Responsibility to
Protect, failure of states to meet their responsibility to
safeguard, or in cases of willful commission of harm
against people, will result in the abrogation of sovereignty
and the international community will assume the
responsibility to remedy the situation.72
Six principles contained in The Responsibility to
Protect establish criteria for international intervention that
gives the international community guidelines as to when
intervention is appropriate and permissible.73
These
principles are (1) Just Cause, allowing the international
community to intervene only when there is an extraordinary
amount of suffering occurring; (2) Right Intention, where
69
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the international community can only intervene if it is for
the purpose of stopping human suffering; (3) Proportional
Means, which requires the international community to use
the most minimal means to stop human suffering; (4) Last
Resort, which requires all non-military options to be
exhausted before force is used; (5) Reasonable Prospects,
where military intervention will not take place unless there
is a reasonable likelihood that it will be successful; and (6)
Right Authority, where Security Council authorization
should be sought before intervention occurs.74
Support for The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is
growing.
According to Rebecca Hamilton in The
Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine civil
society organizations, state governments, and international
bodies, including the United Nations, are endorsing the
principles of The Responsibility to Protect.75 Growing
support of The Responsibility to Protect doctrine
necessitates a mechanism in international law that supports
the principle of intervention in response to gross violations
of international law. The Security Council, under the
United Nations Charter, has the authority to act as the
international community’s voice in these matters.76
The Security Council’s practice, as detailed below,
shows that the precedent has already been established to
authorize intervention in situations where human rights
have been violated. Essentially, The Responsibility to
Protect doctrine has already been utilized, albeit not always
explicitly by reference, in situations where the Security
Council has authorized intervention to remedy human
74
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rights violations. But with an emerging responsibility of
the international community to intervene, evidenced by
increasing support of The Responsibility to Protect, the
current Security Council framework is not sufficient to
support the responsibility of the international community.
Is a Security Council duty to authorize intervention
necessary? Probably so. To say otherwise would ignore
the responsibility of the international community and, at the
same time, the United Nations Charter.
IV. Past and Present Practice of the Security Council
There is evidence of an emerging duty on the part of
the Security Council to authorize intervention in gross
human rights violations. The past practice of the Security
Council has shown that by authorizing intervention with
respect to human rights and humanitarian law violations, it
compels authorization to intervene in certain situations in
the future. Such practice, at a minimum, can be evidence
of the Security Council’s ability to make international law
at least with respect to the United Nations Charter
framework.77 The Security Council’s past actions on
human rights and humanitarian issues is compelling
evidence that a self-created duty to intervene is emerging.
The Security Council has stated in past resolutions
that “widespread violations of international humanitarian
law” constitute threats to peace under the United Nations
Charter.78 In fact, Malcolm Shaw believes that the Security
Council’s practice in the area of “civil war and internal
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strife” has allowed Article 39 to apply in cases of internal
armed conflict.79
In the past, the Security Council has authorized
intervention for the purpose of securing adherence to
international human rights. The United Nations has an
interest in authorizing intervention in areas where human
rights violations have taken place because of the
importance that human rights and humanitarian law play in
international law in general. This interest has come, not
from the argument for a legal duty for intervention to
occur, but rather because of the international pressures and
obligations surrounding past conflict. In these situations,
the Security Council used the current United Nations
Charter framework to intervene.
The authors of International Human Rights in a
Nutshell, consider the decisions by the Security Council to
include hints that the old customary international law
doctrine of collective intervention, present before the
creation of the Security Council, may be becoming more
prevalent.80 The Security Council has not referred to any
pre-UN doctrine specifically—although, as mentioned
previously, there has been reference to the newer
Responsibility to Protect. However, the Security Council’s
decisions show that there is at least a belief in the
international community that intervention should be
authorized in response to large-scale violations of human
rights.81
The belief that the Security Council should
intervene in gross violations of human rights started after
the end of the Cold War when an increase in action,
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pursuant to humanitarian crisis and human rights violations,
started to take place under the auspice of Chapter VII of the
Charter.82 Chapter VII, which applies to “threats of the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,”83
would now apply to human rights cases as well.84
The Security Council’s main focus is to maintain
international peace and security.85 Is not the violation of
human rights and international humanitarian law a breach
of international peace and security? The Security Council
has determined that it does in many cases, as described
below. In many situations, beginning in the 1990s, the
Security Council had declared threats to international peace
and security for human rights and humanitarian reasons. In
the following examples, the motives of the Security
Council included the position that human rights are of the
highest importance and must be protected. Pursuant to
Article 39, they determined a threat to international peace
and security, and acted to authorize intervention.
In 1992, under Resolution 770, the Council
determined that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
warranted use of force to protect humanitarian interests.86
The Security Council described the situation in BosniaHerzegovina as constituting “a threat to international peace
and security” reasoning that humanitarian violations,
including abuses committed against civilians, were a major
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consideration in authorizing intervention through the use of
force.87
Later in 1992, the Security Council authorized
another intervention with “military enforcement
measures”88—this time in Somalia. Under Security Council
Resolution 794 the Council described the “magnitude of the
human tragedy caused by the conflict” combined with “the
obstacles created to the distribution of humanitarian
assistance” created a threat to international peace and
security.89 The resolution further expressed alarm “of
widespread violations of international humanitarian law
occurring” which included reports of “violence and threats
of violence” against those engaged in humanitarian efforts,
“deliberate attacks on non-combatants, relief consignments
and vehicles, and medical and relief facilities,” and in
stopping help from arriving to those in need.90
A few years later, in 1994, the Security Council
authorized military intervention in Rwanda.
Under
Security Council Resolution 929, the Council described the
“magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda” as
constituting “a threat to peace and security in the region.”91
The Security Council referenced the killing of civilians by
the parties to the conflict and the displacement that those
killings caused as being part of the decision to authorize
intervention.92
Later in 1994, the continued situation in Haiti,
which originated from the ousting of the elected president,
87
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turned into a humanitarian crisis moving the Security
Council to act by passing Resolution 940.93 The resolution
was passed because of, among other reasons, “the
significant further deterioration of the humanitarian
situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by
the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil
liberties” and the “plight of Haitian refugees.”94 Under
Chapter VII, the resolution granted intervention authorizing
“member states to form a multinational force under unified
command and control and, in this framework, to use all
necessary means” to end military leadership, return the
ousted president and restore legitimate authorities, and to
“establish and maintain a secure and stable environment”
under the Governors Island Accord.95
In 1996, the Security Council authorized
The resolution
humanitarian intervention in Zaire.96
authorizing intervention stated that the “situation in eastern
Zaire constitutes a threat to international peace and security
in the region.”97
In 1997, the Security Council again authorized
intervention for humanitarian reasons in Albania under the
auspice of the crisis being a “threat to international peace
and security in the region.”98 Resolution 1101 called for an
end to the acts of violence occurring in Albania and
authorized “a temporary and limited multinational
93
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protection force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of
humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure
environment for the missions of international organizations
in Albania, including those providing humanitarian
assistance.”99
In 1999, the Security Council, under Resolution
1244 authorized an international civil and security presence
in Kosovo in order “to resolve the grave humanitarian
situation” and “to provide for the safe and free return of all
refugees and displaced persons to their homes.”100 The
resolution describes the situation in Kosovo to be one of
“humanitarian tragedy.”101 The resolution also states that
one of the key purposes of the international security force
was to protect and promote human rights.102
Later in 1999, the Security Council determined that
a threat to international peace and security continued to
exist in East Timor—authorizing a United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
“empowered to exercise all legislative and executive
authority, including the administration of justice.103 The
threat existed because of “the grave humanitarian situation
resulting from violence in East Timor and the large-scale
displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians,
including large numbers of women and children”104 and
because of “reports indicating that systematic, widespread
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and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and
human rights law have been committed in East Timor.”105
In 2003, the Security Council authorized an Interim
Multinational Force in the Congo to, among other things,
“contribute to the improvement of the humanitarian
situation.”106 The resolution authorizing intervention refers
to “fighting and atrocities” with regard to the humanitarian
situation.107
Later in 2003, the Security Council authorized the
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a stabilization
force created for humanitarian intervention reasons.108 The
resolution declared: “the situation in Liberia continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the
region, to stability in the West Africa sub region, and to the
peace process for Liberia.”109 The threat to international
peace and security was declared to be because of, among
other reasons, the “violation of human rights, particularly
atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread
sexual violence against women and children.”110
In 2004, the situation in Haiti again was determined
to constitute a threat to international peace and security by
the Security Council.111 The adopted resolution cited
evidence of a threat existing due to the continuing violence
and deterioration of the humanitarian situation.112 The
resolution authorized the deployment of a Multinational
105
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Interim Force to “maintain public safety and law and to
promote and protect human rights.”113
Later in 2004, the Security Council authorized
African Union observers in Darfur because of the “ongoing
humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights
violations, including continued attacks on civilians that are
placing the lives of hundreds of thousands at risk.”114 The
Security Council determined the situation constituted a
threat to international peace and security.115 In 2006, the
Security Council reiterated that the situation was a threat to
international peace and security and began the process of
incorporating a United Nations operation.116 In 2007, a coUnited Nations-African Union force was implemented by
the decision of the Security Council.117 In that decision, the
Security Council stated that it regarded the situation
occurring in Darfur to be a violation of human rights and
international humanitarian law and that the situation was
still a threat to international peace and security.118
Most recently in 2011, the Security Council
authorized intervention in Libya.119 The resolution, while
precluding an occupations force, gave member states the
ability to use “all necessary measures” to protect civilians
and populated areas under attack by Libyan governmental
forces.120 Use of force allowed the Libyan opposition to
fend off attack, prevent killings by governmental forces,
and eventually topple the Qadhafi regime that committed
113
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human rights
civilians.121

and

humanitarian

violations

against

The above situations determine for certain that the
Security Council is not limited to the strict interpretation of
the Charter. The Council has shown that its power to
determine “threats to international peace and security” can
apply in other contexts,122 in particular, within the realm of
humanitarian and human rights contexts through Article 39,
which makes decisions binding. The above situations show
that the Council has determined humanitarian and human
rights violations to constitute threats to international peace
and security.
The previously illustrated situations, if not creating
a state practice standard important to create customary
international law binding on states, almost certainly place
an international law custom standard important for
international law interpretation binding on the United
Nations Charter.123 Inger Osterdahl states, “The way the
Security Council interprets and applies the UN Charter has
an effect on the import of the Charter because Security
Council is an authoritative and important body within the
Charter system and, moreover, holds the rare power to take
legally binding decisions.”124 He goes on to suggest that,
121

David Clark, Libyan Intervention was a Success, Despite the
Aftermath's Atrocities, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 28,2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/28/interventionlibya-success.
122
Shaw, supra note 25, at 1240.
123
Osterdahl, supra note 77, at 2. Customary international law is
traditionally created by “opinio juris” and state practice. See Jo Lynn
Slama, Opinio Juris in Customary International Law, 15 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REV. 603, 617-18 (1990). See also The Statute of the International
Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 933, 3
Bevans 1179.
124
Osterdahl, supra note 77, at 19.
249

through practice, the Security Council makes Charter law
and that the only way the Security Council could cease this
practice is to stop adopting resolutions.125 Adding to
Osterdahl’s premise, Articles 25 and 49 require member
states to carry out decisions of the Security Council, giving
decisions of the Council a binding effect—perhaps an
elevated legal effect.126
Though traditional standards of creating law
through performance, i.e. state practice, apply to states in
creating general customary international law, it makes
sense to allow Security Council practice to play a role in
interpreting the United Nations Charter. Further, Security
Council practice could create a traditional customary
international law norm in existence outside the Charter law.
As such, the practice of the Security Council in authorizing
intervention in the human rights and humanitarian
situations described above, over time, is creating an
emerging duty on the Security Council to intervene if the
above examples are to be given weight under the “practice”
portion of creating customary international law.
If the Security Council can make Charter law, the
Security Council, through its past actions, is declaring to
the world that human rights and humanitarian law
ultimately deserve forceful intervention when all other
measures fail.127 In so declaring, the Security Council
establishes a duty upon itself because it is the only entity
that can authorize such action.
In the alternative, assuming arguendo that the
Security Council cannot use its own actions to interpret the
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Charter framework, do not the actions of the states taking
part to enforce the Security Council’s decisions in cases of
humanitarian and human rights violations show that state
practice and opinio juris exist to support the duty? Should
the act of states “merely” carrying out the authorization of
the Security Council, through continued practice of
intervening on behalf of these principles establish such a
duty on the Security Council by traditional customary
international law methods? I think that it does. States take
part in drafting the resolutions (through membership), take
part in the decisions of the Security Council (as members),
and carry out binding decisions (by direction).128 Such a
process, if applied to situations of one doctrine—human
rights and humanitarian law—surely satisfies the customary
international law prerequisites of state practice and opinio
juris. Essentially, it can be argued that states intervening
pursuant to Security Council resolutions are establishing
state practice and the Security Council and participating
states are establishing opinio juris.
The counterargument to the proposition that
Security Council interventions are creating an emerging
duty to intervene is that there are times when the Security
Council may have decided not to authorize intervention.
Of course, non-intervention is difficult to address because
traditional methods of creating international law refer to
practice, not the lack thereof, to be the constitutive element
of customary international law. In fact, looking at lack of
practice in this area would serve little purpose. Law
develops over time. As such, a linear observation must be
taken into account. As illustrated above, the Security
Council has been increasingly willing to intervene in
situations on the more recent part of history’s timeline.129
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This should be taken into account because, as times change,
so does the law (as it should). Law is not stagnant; it is
molded with the experience and actions of our world. The
Security Council’s practice shows that its influence on the
Charter reflects progressive and modern ways of looking at
and valuing the human condition.130
Inger Osterdahl, commenting on inconsistent
Security Council practice states, “even though it acts in an
inconsistent or ad-hocish way, whatever action the Security
Council takes has a normative impact.”131 The combined
notion of accepting practice (as opposed to non-practice),
the restrictive circumstances upon which Security Council
action affects only Charter interpretation, and the increased
nature of interventions show that non-intervention should
not be considered when interpreting the Charter framework.
V. Duty to Authorize Intervention – A Proposed
Logical Legal Framework
Although I have already posited an emerging duty
on the part of the Security Council based on its own
practice, a logical, normative argument can also be made in
favor of imposing a duty on the Security Council.
Premise: The Security Council has a duty to
intervene when human rights violations have occurred. Is
there an alternative? The Security Council, and no other
entity, has the power to authorize intervention under the
United Nations Charter framework.132 Because of the
refusal of the Security Council to get involved in some
areas where clear human rights and humanitarian law
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violations are occurring, there is a disconnect. A refusal to
accept a situation exists to preclude states from acting, just
as refusing to act in the face of a recognized humanitarian
crisis. Before the United Nations came into existence,
there was a clear right of states to intervene—a right
present before the proliferation of human rights and
humanitarian law in the international context.133
Today, there is an international standard for human
rights and humanitarian law, as well as a voluntary remedy
through the Security Council for violations of that law. But
this is not enough. For the following reasons, the current
UN charter framework and the current state of international
humanitarian law and human rights demands that the
Security Council be required to authorize intervention in
cases of humanitarian and human rights gross violations.
International law makes humanitarian and human
rights violations unlawful.134 The duty, first and foremost,
falls to the individual state to ensure adherence to the
law.135 This is as it should be. States should take care that
subjects and citizens are guaranteed their human rights, and
should refrain from committing any sort of violation
against them. However, sometimes states do not comply
with this principle.136 In such a case, the state has failed to
exercise its duty.

133

See supra notes 48-64.
See, e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
(July 8); The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26. See also, DAVID
LUBAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
1039, 1043 (2010).
135
The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26.
136
See supra notes 86-121.
134

253

When the state fails in its duty to ensure
humanitarian and human rights, it becomes an international
issue and concern, as humanitarian and human rights law is
of international concern. The humane treatment of people
is an interest that the human condition demands. Thus, as
an international issue, the United Nations, being the forum
and entity that has emerged as the central international
body on Earth, assumes the issue on behalf of the
international community. Again, individual states, or
coalitions of states, cannot interfere at this point in any
other way than through diplomacy and other actions short
of intervention, as the United Nations Charter will not
allow it137 unless and until the Security Council permits
it.138
By signing onto the United Nations Charter,
individual member states gave up the portion of their
authority to make unilateral decisions with regard to use of
force without “world” consent (i.e., without the Security
Council’s approval).
The legal dilemma comes to a head when the
permissive framework meets the passive or non-interested
state parties.
Assume there is a universally understood situation
of gross humanitarian and human rights violations
occurring in the world—a situation that is generally agreed
upon by the majority of United Nations member states as
constituting a situation in dire need of intervention, but the
Security Council is deadlocked. Because states cannot
interfere without the authorization of the Security Council
by virtue of the United Nations Charter, there is a deadlock
in international law. People are harmed without any
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remedy to alleviate their suffering or make the situation
right, except by taking up arms.139
The question that I posed earlier is still relevant.
Can the duty fall to any other entity under the current state
of international humanitarian and human rights law in light
of the current United Nations Charter framework? No. By
sheer necessity, the Security Council holds the duty to
authorize intervention, as a last resort, in cases of gross
violations of humanitarian and human rights. Based upon
the importance that the international community has placed
on humanitarian and human rights, it is evident that it is of
utmost concern to ensure that those rights are adhered to.
Thus, a logical conclusion is that a duty has arisen. By
virtue of the international legal framework existing in the
form of the United Nations Charter, that duty falls to the
Security Council in humanitarian and human rights
cases.140 Similar to the reasons Professor Sellers gave for
interference sometimes being necessary because it cannot
be totally avoided in any legal system, the duty of the
Security Council is necessary here because it is the only
entity that can act, it has acted before, and it is necessary
that it do so in certain future situations.141
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Conclusion
The Security Council should have a duty to
authorize intervention in circumstances of gross violation
of human rights, humanitarian law, or crimes against
humanity. It is likely that the duty, as understood under
customary international law, is not currently present.
However, what appears to be an emerging duty out of the
Security Council’s practice is promising for the future of
human rights and humanitarian law enforcement.
Normative arguments are also promising as they give an
alternative to the “practice” assertion.
Before the formation of the United Nations,
intervention was a collective right of states.142 During the
pre-United Nations period, however, the prevalence of
human rights and humanitarian law was not as paramount
and defined as it is today. The establishment of the United
Nations and the proliferation of humanitarian law and
human rights, including the new category of crimes against
humanity, establish that the treatment of humanity is a
paramount concern of the world community.
That
paramount concern is expressed through the United
Nations. Expression of this vital concern is manifested and
remedied by the Security Council in its actions to cure
situations where humanitarian violations exist. As the
Security Council is the mechanism set up to maintain world
order and ensure the peace and prosperity of the world, it
makes sense that it have a duty to espouse the values of
humanity by enforcing international human rights and
humanitarian law. That a duty will arise on the part of the
Security Council seems inevitable, if not already present, as
described by normative arguments.

142

See Supra notes 48-64.

256

Failure of a state to protect its citizens or
affirmative actions taken to harm civilians necessitates
authorization for intervention. The Security Council was
established up to maintain international peace and security
but its purpose evolved to enforcing human rights and
humanitarian law. There is no other entity that can
authorize intervention. When all diplomatic options fail, the
world turns to the Security Council for authorization to
intervene.
Its duty should always be to authorize
intervention when great suffering occurs, when people are
massacred, where torture is present, and where the state
cannot or will not protect the people—essentially in
situations of gross human rights violations. In the face of
the protracted situation in Syria, and other instances of
humanitarian and human rights atrocities occurring around
the world, the need for recognizing a Security Council duty
to authorize intervention is paramount and necessary.
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